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I. INTRODUCTION
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in
the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what

is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next
is either to kill him or to tame him and make him a useful animal.'

T

HE OBJECT of this paper is to expose the features of foreign
sovereign immunity and the case law that has emerged in
response to this defense. When Congress enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("Immunities Act") it introduced into our law, for the first time, comprehensive provisions
to inform parties when they have recourse to the courts to assert
a legal claim against a foreign state.! This paper discusses (1) the
origins of foreign sovereign immunity in the United States courts,
(2) the Immunities Act and recent case law construing its provisions, and (3) the role of foreign sovereign immunity in modem
aviation tort litigation. Before addressing the intricacies of foreign
sovereign immunity however, it will be useful to examine some
basic problems of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction connotes the power of a court to affect a person's
legal relations and in personam jurisdiction denotes a court's
power to award a final judgment that imposes personal liability
against a defendant. A state may affect a person's legal interests
only insofar as that state has power over him:
The fundamental requirement as to the jurisdiction of a State over
a person is that there should be such a relation between the State
and the person that it is reasonable for the State to exercise control
over him through its courts."
The power a court holds over the parties to a lawsuit may, in
some circumstances, derive from the presence of a defendant
within the territory of the forum.5 Ordinarily, when the defendant
'Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
228 U.S.C. § 1330, 1332(a)(2)-1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), and 16021611 (1976). For a discussion of the English treatment of foreign sovereign immunity, see Bird, The State Immuity Act of 1978: An English Update, 13 INT'L
LAw. 619 (1979).
3See Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Harriga, 462 F. Supp. 1165,
1168-71 (D. Md. 1978).
4RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS S 14, comment a (1942).
5 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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is a domestic corporation, being a creature of the state of its
incorporation, it is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
courts of that state. This general rule will prevail even though this
corporation may not do business in the forum.
When the defendant is a foreign corporation the issue becomes
complicated. When the foreign corporation has obtained authority
from the forum to do business there, it may be treated as though
it is a domestic corporation and in personam jurisdiction may be
acquired. When the foreign corporation does not take the trouble
to obtain an authorization, however, another basis of in personam
jurisdiction is required. It is in this realm that the genius of the
common law in creating legal fictions excelled. Looking for a predicate for corporate jurisdiction smilar to the physical presence
of an individual in a state, American courts seized the concept of
"doing business" in a forum.' Since a corporation could not be
physically present within a forum, the nearest cousin was adopted;
a foreign corporation was "deemed" to be physically present when
its activities in the forum were substantial enough to support a
finding that it was doing business within that forum. Moreover,
in response to modem constitutional rulings expanding the right
of the states to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a host of
foreign corporations that would have escaped jurisdiction under
the doing business predicate, the legislatures of the states promulgated jurisdictional status that created the basis of "long arm"
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.8 In an appropriate case, a
foreign corporation may perform a single act that, because of its
nature, quality, and the circumstances of its commission, is sufficient to subject the corporation to in personam jurisdiction.! An
attribute that is common to all of these "long-arm" statutes is that
the claim must arise out of an act performed in the forum.'"
When the defendant is an entity owned by a foreign state
the issue becomes more complex. The Immunities Act con-

e7 RESTATEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1942).
E.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
"E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972).

' Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
with International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
"'E.g., Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 A.D. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d Dept.
1953). In this connection, note particularly the provisions of New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules § 302(b) (McKinney 1972).
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tains a special rule of in personam jurisdiction. Its peculiarity lies
in the fact that it omits any provision for the jurisdictional predicate of "doing business."'" In other words, Congress, through the
Immunities Act, has not exercised its full constitutional power and
has granted American courts in personam jurisdiction over foreign
state enterprises, assuming proper service, only when the claim,
as distinguished from the entity, has a connection with the territory of the United States. As a consequence, no lawyer contemplating a suit against a foreign state entity in an American court
should assume that a court has in personam jurisdiction merely
because that entity does business within the forum.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP
The freedom of a foreign state from being haled into court has
impressive title-deeds and has become part of the very fabric of
our law. It assumed this position solely through the adjudications
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Unlike the special
position accorded the Sister States by the Eleventh Amendment,
the privileged position of a foreign state was not an explicit command of our Constitution. Instead it rested on the common law
created by the Supreme Court. The rise of foreign sovereign immunity can be contrasted with the decline of the immunity enjoyed by the United States as a territorial sovereign. The latter
form of sovereign immunity was found to be increasingly in conflict with the growing subjection of American governmental action
to moral judgment. As early as 1797, this chilly feeling against
sovereign immunity began to reflect itself in federal legislation."'
At that time Congress decided that when the United States sues
an individual, the individual can set-off all debts properly due
from the sovereign to him. In addition, because of the objections
to ad hoc legislative allowances of private claims, Congress, some
fifty years later, created the Court of Claims where the United
States, like any other obligor, may be held affirmatively to its
undertakings. 3
"Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). See
note 37 infra.
12Act of March 3, 1797, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. 514-15. The present version appears

in 28 U.S.C. 5 2406 (1976).
"Act

of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, amended by 12 Stat. 765, 14 Stat. 9.;

see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976).
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On the other hand, the doctrine of immunity for foreign states
gradually developed at the bar of the Supreme Court. Early in
our judicial history Mr. Justice Marshall, in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon," recognized a foreign state's claim of immunity where a vessel was in the foreign state's possession and
service. In that case the Court introduced in the federal courts the
practice of surrendering jurisdiction when the Executive certified
to the Judiciary its endorsement of immunity." Marshall articulated the view that no sovereign could be made amenable to another and that "the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by
implication, and will be extended to him."" Under this view, a
foreign state was absolutely immune from suit without its consent.
As international commerce began to grow, the "restrictive" theory
of immunity began to emerge. This approach expanded immunity
to public acts and contracted it with respect to private acts. In
other words, a foreign state shed its mantle of sovereignty when
it entered the marketplace.'
As the agency responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs,
the Department of State was the normal organ that suggested to
the courts that a foreign state be granted immunity from a particular suit."' Its failure or refusal to suggest immunity was accorded significant weight by the Supreme Court."' This deference
was based on the consideration of the potentially embarrassing
consequences on diplomatic relations that could accompany judicial rejection of a claim of foreign sovereign immunity. In 1952,
through the famous Tate Letter," the Department of State made
it clear that its policy would be to decline to recommend immunity
to foreign sovereigns in suits airising out of private or commercial
activity. Yet the department offered no criteria for differentiating
Cranch 116 (1812).
1"Id. at 147.
1Ild. at 137.
'"See United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 785-86 (Tex. 1977);
see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in
5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
147

House

REPORT].

See Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943).
"'See, e.g., Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
2"26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
"
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between private and public acts.' To further complicate matters,
the Department of State, being subject to political pressure, was
not consistent in its own approach. Under the circumstances, it
is not surprising that neither the courts nor commentators were
able to suggest any satisfactory test." Some looked to the nature
of the transaction and categorized as sovereign only those activities that could not be performed by individuals.' While this cri-

terion was relatively easy to apply, it often produced astonishing
results. For example, some European courts held that the purchase of bullets or shoes for the army, the erection of fortifications
for defense, or the rental of a house for an embassy were private
acts." Other courts looked to the purpose of the transaction, categorizing as public all activities in which the object of performance
was public in nature. ' This test was even more unsatisfactory because, conceptually, the modem state always acts for a public
purpose." Functionally, the criterion was purely arbitrary and
necessarily involved the courts in projecting subjective notions
about the proper realm of state action."
In due course this conceptual dichotomy became unworkable
and capricious. In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of
Greece, Ministry of Commerce, Purchase Directorate" the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a contract
for the shipment of grain was a private act, while in Isbrandtsen
Tankers, Inc. v. President of India" the same court, five years
later, held that a similar contract was a public act. In Kingdom
of Romania f. Guaranty Trust Co." the plaintiff contracted for
2" See, e.g., Victoria Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
"336 F.2d at 359-60.
2Id.
21 E. ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS
31 (1933).
Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviety State Trading, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 614, 621 (1950).

"Lauterpacht,

28 BRIT. Y. B.

The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States,

INT'L

L. 220, 224 (1951).

The Growth of State Control Over the Individual, and its
Effect Upon the Rules of International State Responsibility, 19 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 118, 128 (1938).
28360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
9446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
30250 F. 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918).
27Friedmann,
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the purchase of goods for use by the Romanian army. The Second
Circuit held that a counter-claim arising out of the same transaction could be asserted by the defendant, while in Et Ve Balik
Kurumu v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp.,31 over forty years
later, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in a case involving the purchase of food for consumption by the Turkish army,
reached the opposite conclusion.
In those instances where a foreign state failed to obtain the
coveted suggestion of immunity, the courts were known to retain
jurisdiction without further inquiry. As could be expected, this
deference by the Judiciary to the Executive generated considerable dissatisfaction.' The conceptual difficulties involved in formulating a satisfactory method of differentiating between public and
private acts led many commentators to declare that the distinction
was useless. ' The Supreme Court held, however, that when the
Department of State was silent on the question of immunity in a
case, it became the court's duty to determine for itself whether a
foreign state was entitled to immunity "in conformity to the principles accepted by the department of the government charged with
the conduct of foreign relations."' Since the Department of State
publicly pronounced its adherence to the distinctions, it had to be
applied.
In order to create some order out of chaos and to relieve the
Department of State from a judicial function and the accompanying political pressure, Congress created the Immunities Act.' The
Immunities Act frames the issues to be solved in deciding the
question of immunity and formulates standards that are to be
applied to those issues. These issues should be resolved in the following order: whether the defendant is a foreign state and therefore
3125 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), afid, 17 A.D.2d 927,
233 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (App. Div. 1962).
11 Petrol Shipping Corp. v. The Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce,
Purchase Directorate, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
-3Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?, 40 AM.
J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
34Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14
BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 101, 123-24 (1933).
35 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
36See Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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has standing to invoke the Immunities Act; whether any exceptions apply; and, if not, whether immunity has been waived.
III. THE IMMUNITIES ACT
A. An Overview
The general rule of the Immunities Act, subject to certain ex-

ceptions, is that a "foreign state" is immune from the jurisdiction
of the courts of the United States and of the several States."7 The
courts alone are responsible for determining whether a foreign
state is entitled to immunity under the Immunities Act.' The
Department of State no longer has a role to play in this determination.

When a court is faced with a claim of foreign sovereign immunity, the first issue that it must resolve is whether the defendant
falls within the definition of a "foreign state." That term includes

a political subdivision of the foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of the state.' An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign

state" means any entity that is an organ of a foreign state or
political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other
3728 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Venue provisions appear at 28 U.S.C. S 1391(f)
(1976). The Immunities Act "makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction
simple: subject matter jurisdiction [§§ 1330(a) and 1605-1607] plus service of
process [5 1608] equals personal jurisdiction [§ 1330(b)]." Texas Trading &
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 80-7703, slip op. at 2592
(2d Cir. April 16, 1981).
"A section 1605(a)(2) case" calls for the resolution of five questions. As
stated in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No.
80-7703, slip op. at 2592-93 (2d Cir. April 16, 1981), they are:
1) Does the conduct the action is based upon or related to qualify
as "commercial activity"?
2) Does that commercial activity bear the relation to the cause
of action and to the United States described by one of the three
phrases of § 1605(a)(2), warranting the Court's exercise of
subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a)?
3) Does the exercise of this congressional subject matter jurisdiction exists within the permissible limits of the "judicial power"
set forth in Article III?
4) Does subject matter jurisdiction under § 1330(a) and service
under S 1608 exist, thereby making personal jurisdiction proper
under § 1330(b)?
5) Does the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 1330(b) comply with the due process clause, thus making personal jurisdiction proper?
3828 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
"28 U.S.C. S 1603(a) (1976).
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ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and which is' neither a citizen of a State of the
United States nor created under the laws of any third country.'
A foreign state has an absolute right to have the suit removed from
a state court to a federal district court. 1
Once the "foreign state" status is determined, immunity is automatic unless one of the exceptions applies. The most important
exception, other than waiver, is the "commercial activities" exception embodied in section 1605(a) (2) of the Immunities Act.
Under this section foreign sovereign immunity is unavailable in
an action based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by a foreign state (hereinafter referred to as clause
one), or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with the commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere (hereinafter referred to as clause two), or upon an act performed outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere and that act causes
a direct effect in the United States (hereinafter referred to as
clause three).'
Other exceptions include section 1605(a) (3) which denies immunity in two categories of cases where rights in property taken
in violation of international law are in issue. The first category
involves cases where the property is present in the United States
in connection with commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state.' The second category is where the
property, or any property exchanged for such property, is owned
or operated by a foreign state and it is engaged in commercial
activity in the United States.' The term "taken in violation of
international law" includes the expropriation of property without
payment of compensation as required by international law. Since
this section deals solely with the issue of immunity, it does not affect existing law concerning the extent to which the "act of state"
doctrine may be applicable.'
4028 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976).
4'28 U.S.C. S 1441(d) (1976).

428 U.S.C. 5 1605(a)(2) (1976).
128 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(3) (1976).
4id.

"HousE

REPORT,

supra note 17, at 20. Cf. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
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Section 1605 (a) (5) governs non-commercial torts and provides
that immunity is not available to a foreign state in cases in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death, or damages to or loss of property, that occurs
in the United States and is caused by the tortious act or omission
of a foreign state or any official or employee of a foreign state
while acting within the scope of his employment.' This provision
allows immunity if the action is based upon acts of malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights." Moreover, a foreign
state retains immunity by virtue of this provision if the claim is
based upon an official's performance of a discretionary function,
regardless of whether that discretion was abused.'
Paragraph 5 is applicable only to the issue of a "foreign state's"
obligation to answer suit. It is not addressed to the issue of the
personal liability of an individual claiming diplomatic immunity.
In this connection Congress has adopted the rules of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations as our law on diplomatic
immunities.'
A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction of American courts if it has waived its immunity." Among the ways immunity can be waived is by treaty or by private contract. In such
cases the waiver may not be withdrawn except in accordance with
the terms set forth in the original waiver."
Section 1605(b) of the Immunities Act denies immunity in
cases where a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a lien against
a vessel or cargo of a foreign state, the maritime lien is based
upon a commercial activity of the foreign state and the conditions
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (discussion of the "act of state" doctrine). Dunhill was only a plurality opinion and it is not entirely clear that
commercial activities are always not subject to an act of state defense. Footnote
1 of the House Report at 20 suggests that Congress presumed that any case
falling within section 1605(a)(3)

would not be subject to an act of state de-

fense. Thus at least to the extent that a claim falls within section 1605(a)(3)
one may argue that the act of state doctrine should not apply.

' 28 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(5) (1976).
§ 1605(a)(5)(B) (1976).
1'28 U.S.C. S 1605(c)(5)(A) (1976).
" 22 U.S.C. § 254(a)-(e) (Supp. III 1979).
s028 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(1) (1976).
5128 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(1) (1976).
4728 U.S.C.
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in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section have been met." Section
1605(b) does not preclude either a suit in accordance with other
provisions of the Immunities Act, such as section 1605(a) (2) or
a second action, otherwise permissible, to recover the amount by
which the value of the lien exceeds the recovery in the first action.
B. The Statute's Standing Requirements
The federal courts have non-exclusive jurisdiction over "any
nonjury civil action against a foreign state" with respect to any

claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. ' The
Immunities Act establishes a procedure whereby a plaintiff may
bring a foreign state before an American court, either state or federal, obtain a ruling on its immunity, and secure an adjudication

of his claim.
To interpret the Immunities Act a court must first focus on
whether the defendant may be classified as a "foreign state" and
thus be entitled to invoke, in any set of circumstances, the protection offered by the Immunities Act. In most cases the issue of
a foreign state, qua country, is not controversial.' In some cir5228 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976).
-3Id.
5428 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). See note 37 supra. Exactly what the ramifications are of Congress' wording with respect to the right to trial by jury is a
matter of considerable dispute. Compare Ruggiero v. Compania Panama de
Vapores, 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Herman v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd.,
15 Av. L. REP. (CCH) 5 18,507 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Jones v. Shipping Corp.
of India, Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Va. 1980); and Williams v. Shipping
Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980) (jury demand stricken) with
Houston v. Murmansk Shipping Co., 87 F.R.D. 71 (D. Md. 1980); Rex. v. Cia.
Pervana de Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Icenogle v.
Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979); and Lonon v. Companhia
de Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (jury demand
upheld). In view of the fact that the Immunities Act does not give the federal
courts exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign states,
a claim against such a defendant may also be asserted in state court. The
Immunities Act does not specifically address the question, in the latter situation,
of the right to a jury trial.
(The author wishes to thank Olympic's attorneys for making available to
him the affidavits and memoranda that were submitted to the court in connection
with the motion to strike the jury demand.).
"Compare Windert Watch Co., Inc. v. Remex Electronics Limited, 468 F.
Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Hong Kong is a Crown Colony and not a political
subdivision of the United Kingdom) with Gray v. Permanent Mission of the
People's Republic of the Congo to the United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978) (the mission is itself a foreign
state, not a mere instrumentality of a foreign state).
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cumstances, however, the identity of a defendant has been put
in issue. In Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Krsko6' the
question was whether the defendant, a workers' organization, was
an organ or political subdivision of Yugoslavia. Since diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction was absent, the plaintiff attempted to maintain "federal question" jurisdiction under the Immunities Act.
Accordingly, the plaintiff contended, in a reverse twist, that the
defendant was an agency or instrumentality of Yugoslavia. In
observing that the defendant's activity was virtually free from
governmental control, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia held that state ownership, without more, was
not determinative of this defendant's status under the Immunities
Act.' As a result, the court dismissed the action for lack of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, in
Outboard Marine Corp. v. PEZETEL' the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant, a Polish government-owned corporation, was engaged primarily in commercial activities common to private companies that were not state-owned or controlled. The defendant
contended that it, like the Republic of Poland, was entitled to
sovereign status." In rejecting this argument the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware stated:
It does not follow that because a business in such a country has
objectives and governmental ties alien to those of enterprises in a
capitalist system that each such business is equal in stature to the
government under which it operates."
Since PEZETEL was not considered to be equivalent to the Republic of Poland, it, unlike the sovereign, was not immune, under
section 1606, from punitive treble damages for anti-competitive
practices."'
" 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977). In the absence of a claim arising under
federal law, a party may not claim federal question subject matter jurisdiction
by anticipating the defense of foreign sovereign immunity under the Immunities
Act. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, No. 80-7413 (2d Cir. April 16,
1981).
"Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.D.C.

1977).
" 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978).
"'Id.at 394-95.
60 Id. at 396.
11Id. at 397.
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C. Three Exceptions to the General Rule of Immunity

One of the Immunity Act's central features is its specification
in section 1605(a) (2) of categories of actions involving commercial activity for which foreign states are not entitled to claim
immunity. These exceptions involve substantive acts for which a
foreign state may be held accountable in the United States. This
feature of the Immunities Act effects a combination of substance
and procedure whereby a court, faced with an assertion of immunity, must engage in a close comparison of the underlying claim
for relief with section 1605(a) (2) in order to decide, assuming
proper service, whether a foreign state is subject to in personam
jurisdiction under the Immunities Act.
The term "commercial activity" appears in all three clauses of
section 1605(a) (2). In light of this language, the courts have
often avoided the task of separately construing these clauses.
Instead, courts have usually found it expedient to rule on the
common issue of whether the defendant's activities have been
"commercial." ' Under the Immunities Act the character of an
activity is determined by reference to the nature of the act rather
than to its purpose. " In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency"
the plaintiff attempted to show that the defendants had engaged

I Although the Immunities Act does not define "commercial," it does define
"commercial activity" in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) and "commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state" in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1976).
In a case having long range implications, International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Organization of the Petroleum Exploring Countries,
477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), a labor union sued OPEC and its thirteen
member nations alleging illegal price fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Initially, the court held that OPEC could not be served with process
under any federal statute. Id. at 560. The court considered section 1603(d)'s
definition of commercial activity and stated that it should be construed narrowly.
Id. at 567. In holding that the union's claims did not arise out of commercial
activity and that there was no statutory basis to support in personam jurisdiction, the court stated:
In view of our own State and Federal domestic crude oil activities, there can be little question that establishing the terms and
conditions for removal of natural resources from its territory, when
done by a sovereign state, individually and separately, is a governmental activity.
Id. at 568. In addition, the court stated that a foreign sovereign could not be
subject to Sherman Act liability in any event. Id. at 570. It should be noted,
however, that a foreign state may bring suit under the Sherman Act. Pfizer, Inc.
v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 322 (1978).
-28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
"443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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in commercial activity within the meaning of section 1605 (a) (2).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York initially eliminated both the first and second clauses of section 1605 (a) (2) because the alleged libel-the purported commercial activity-was published outside the United States." In
an attempt to invoke clause three, the plaintiff enumerated Novosti's
commercial activities." In rejecting this approach, the court admonished that the focus must be the specific activity giving rise
to the claim and not a general characterization of the entity."
The court found that Novosti's activities were not commercial,
but were acts of intra-governmental cooperation and were to be
regarded as official commentary of the Soviet government. In
Carey v. National Oil Corp." the plaintiffs sought damages because of alleged breaches of contract by the defendant, a company
owned by the Libyan government. As in Novosti Press, the Second
Circuit analyzed the claims for relief in light of clause three. Since
the parties to the instruments resided wholly outside the United
States, the court was unable to find any "direct" effect flowing
into the United States as a consequence of these alleged breaches."
After having found an adequate ground to dismiss the claims, the
court appeared to imply that the defendants would also be entitled
to immunity because they scrupulously avoided meaningful entry
into the United States. 1 This approach, however, shifts the focus
away from the claim's connection with the United States and toward the defendant's activity in the United States. In Upton v.
Empire of Iran,"' travelers were awaiting a flight in an airport
6Id.

at 855.

6"Id.
I Id. at 856.
63 d.

F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979), a0y'g, 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
at 676.
71 Id. The focus of inquiry should not be whether the defendant has done
business in the United States, but whether the plaintiff's claim falls within one
of the three excepting clauses of § 1605(a)(2). Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 80-7703, slip op. at 2598-602 (2d Cir.
April 16, 1981); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Organization for
Chemicals and Foodstuffs, No. 80-7851, slip op. at 2616 (2d Cir. April 16,
1981) (immunity defense stricken).
'459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
It is unclear whether the Warsaw Convention, infra note 113, was applicable.
See note 121 infra.
"592

70Id.
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terminal in Tehran, Iran when the roof collapsed on them. The
plaintiffs alleged negligence and strict liability in tort against both
Iran and its Department of Civil Aviation. Apparently recognizing
the inapplicability of clauses one and two, the plaintiffs contended
that clause three of section 1605(a) (2) vitiated the immunity
defense. The ultimate question under clause three was whether
the accident caused a "direct" effect in the United States. The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia recognized that the Immunities Act was formulated on long-arm jurisdictional concepts. By way of comparison, under the District of
Columbia long-arm statute also passed by Congress the suffering of a loss within the District, as a result of acts outside the
forum, does not establish a satisfactory nexus with the forum to
support in personam jurisdiction. 3 Following this approach, the
court refused to rely on the attenuated connection between an
extraterritorial act and a domestic effect in order to sustain in
personam jurisdiction.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from these cases.
First, the first and second clauses of section 1605(a) (2) were
interpreted to be inapplicable to claims that arose outside the
territory of the United States. Second, clause three of section
1605(a) (2), containing the "direct effect" language, was construed rather narrowly:
The common sense interpretation of a "direct effect" is one which
has no intervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line
without deviation or interruption.'
IV. HARRIS V. VAO INTOURIST
Harris v. VAO Intourist,' the next decision in this line of cases,
is important largely because of its comprehensive and penetrating
analysis of all three clauses of section 1605(a) (2). If there was
any doubt prior to Harris that jurisdiction over a foreign state
corporation could be based merely on that corporation "doing
business" in the United States, Harris put that question to rest.
'1Id. at 266. While not recognized by the court, Iran probably expressly
waived its sovereign immunity through the Treaty of Amity with the United
States, infra notes 99 & 105.
74 Id. at 266.
15481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Harris also clarified clause one of section 1605(a) (2) which requires that an action be "based upon" commercial activity carried
on in the United States.
In October, 1976, Harris' decedent, Raymond De Jongh, a
United States citizen, obtained permission in New York from
Intourist, the Russian National Tourist Agency, to travel to Moscow. Intourist selected the National Hotel in Moscow as De Jongh's
accommodations. During the early morning of October 27, 1976,
a fire erupted in the hotel and caused fatal third degree burns over
ninety-five percent of De Jongh's body. In 1978 Harris filed an
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York against VAO Intourist-Moscow; Intourist-New
York; the National Hotel, and the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics. The complaint alleged that one or more of the defendants
had negligently owned, leased, operated, managed, and controlled
the hotel."
All defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on alternative
grounds that each of them was, under the Immunities Act, immune
from the in personam jurisdiction of the court; or that the court
should invoke its discretion and refrain from exercising its already
acquired jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens;"
or that the plaintiff failed to serve process properly on the defendants. m Without reaching the last two contentions, the court
held that all defendants were entitled to foreign sovereign immunity. The plaintiff did not appeal from the order dismissing the
complaint.
6

1d.
I at 1057.

"The

doctrine of forum non conveniens in the aviation field received

thorough treatment in People ex rel Compagnie Nationale Air France v.
Gilbreto, 74 Ill. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (1978),

cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932

(1979), a case arising out of the 1976 Entebbe hijacking. See also Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d
149 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1346 (1981); Fosen v. United
Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y.), af0'd, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.

1980); Orion Ins. Co. Ltd. v. United Technologies Corp., 15 Av. L. REP.
(CCH) 5 18,061 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Macedo v. Boeing Co., 15 Av. L. REP. (CCH)
5 18,032 (N.D. Il1. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1559 (7th Cir. April 21,

1980); Hemmelgarn v. Boeing Co., 15 Av. L. REP. (CCH)

18,328 (Cal.

App. 1980).
78The first
and third grounds are inter-connected. See note 37 supra. 28

U.S.C. S 1608 (1976) provides the usual, but not the exclusive, method of
service on a foreign state. E.g., New England Merchants Nat. Bank v. Iran
Power Generation and Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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The court recognized that Congress, through the Immunities
Act, "authorized the exercise of less than the complete personal
jurisdiction that might constitutionally be afforded American
courts under traditional concepts of fairness and due process.""
The court was required to decide whether all of the three exceptions found in section 1605(a)(2) encompassed Harris' claim.
Initially, the court observed:
[B]ecause of the absence of a "doing business" provision . . .in

the Immunities Act, the essential factual issue is not the degree of
oblique contacts of the National Hotel with the United States....
Systematic and continuous contacts with the United States do not
provide the grounds for finding an exception to the Immunities
Act and a basis of jurisdiction."0
Clause two of section 1605(a) (2) was quickly disposed of since
it relates only to an action based upon an act performed in the
United States: "Because the allegedly negligent act-unsafe operation of the hotel-took place in The Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics, the second clause does not apply."'"
The court further determined that clause three of section
1605(a) (2) was inapplicable. This clause relates only to an act
which has a "direct effect" in the United States. Judge Weinstein
observed:
[T]he precise issue is not whether the fire had any effect here, but
whether it had a "direct effect" in the United States within the
meaning of the statutory language. Indirect injurious consequences
within this country of an out-of-state act are not sufficient contacts
to satisfy the "direct effect" requirement of section 1605 (a) (2).'
The first clause of section 1605(a) (2), dealing with actions
based upon commercial activity in the United States, although
more difficult to interpret, was also rejected as a means of piercing the defendants' immunity defense. The court compared the
language of the Immunities Act with various long-arm statutes:
"9Harris

v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
1Id.
at 1060.
'1 Id. at 1061.
92Id.
at 1062 Cf., American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D.D.C. 1980 ) (failure to make compensation
0

to American insurance companies at time of taking of property was a "direct"
effect in the United States).
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The first clause of section 1605(a) (2) focuses upon actions
arising from commercial activity within the United States. This is
essentially a clause which deals with the transaction of individual
business deals in the United States. It is not equivalent to the
"doing business" provisions. . .

The clause requires that the

court action "be based upon" the specific commercial activity carried on in the United States. It resembles the "transaction" of
business clauses used in many of the long-arm provisions [citation
omitted]. The commercial activity out of which plaintiff's claim
arises is the operation of the Hotel in Moscow; despite the apparent integration of the Soviet tourist industry, the relationship between the negligent operation of the National Hotel and any activity in the United States is so attenuated that this clause is not
applicable.'
By omitting a "doing business" provision, Congress, through the
Immunities Act, withdrew from the Judiciary a jurisdictional basis
upon which it has traditionally rested its power over foreign corporations. In its place Congress installed a jurisdictional statute
that requires a court to ignore the "doing business" basis and to
determine jurisdiction solely in terms of far more exacting "longarm" considerations. It is surprising that such a radical change in
the traditional approach to jurisdiction is not even mentioned in
the Immunities Act's legislative history. Even more anomalous is
that under section 1605(a) (3) a plaintiff may sue a foreign state
for the taking of property without compensation as long as that
foreign state is engaged in commercial activity within the territory
of the United States, even though its activity in the United States
is not connected with the taking. Thus if Congress intended to
abolish entirely the "doing business" jurisdictional basis, it apparently left a loophole.
The plaintiff in Harris did argue that the defendants had,
through various instruments, waived their right to plead the personal defense of immunity. These instruments were of no aid to
the plaintiff, however, because they did not address directly the
waiver question. In the aviation field, to which we now turn, a
federal statute, certain bilateral treaties, and a multilateral treaty
tend to alleviate the harshness of the Immunities Act.
" 481 F. Supp. at 1061. See Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 988 (N.D. Il1. 1980).
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V. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE
AVIATION TORT FIELD

Although the justification for immunity in the tort field may be
dubious because it thwarts reasonable expectations, it is a hurdle
that will have to be negotiated. In its present form it leaves very
little maneuvering room for a judge who otherwise would be inclined to strike such a defense. This reality was recognized expressly by Judge Weinstein who, at the close of his opinion in Harris
noted: "Responsibility for any change in the statutory balance lies
with Congress, not the courts.""
We now turn to the implications of the Immunities Act for air
carriers and manufacturers in the aviation field. At the present
time there are approximately one hundred major foreign air carriers and fifty major foreign air frame and component suppliers
operating in the world.' Many of them probably have standing to
claim the benefits of the Immunities Act, not the least of which is
foreign sovereign immunity." For example, assuming that a waiv"481

F. Supp. at 1066.

"Fingert, WORLD AVIATION DIRECTORS 251-75 (Summer 1980); Sweetman,
"Commercial Aircraft of the World," FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, October 25, 1980,
at 1575-1638; see also FORTUNE, April 9, 1979, at 102, 104-10.
" For example, the following 14 foreign air carriers appear to be 100%

state owned:
Arelinte Eireann
Aeromexico
Aero Peru
Air Canada
Air India
Air New Zealand
Argentine Airlines
British Airways
British West Indian
Iran Air
Lan-Chile
Nigeria Airways
Olympic
Quantas

***Ireland
Mexico
*Peru
**Canada
India
New Zealand
Argentina
United Kingdom
Trinidad and Tobago
***Iran
* * Chile
Nigeria
** *Greece
Australia

The following 14 foreign air carriers appear to be at least majority stateowned by the percentage shown:
Air France
France
98.55
Air Jamaica
Jamaica
60.00
Air Pacific
Fiji
60.69
Air Zaire
Zaire
64.00

Alitalia
Bahamasair

***Italy
Bahamas

75.50
84.00
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er has not occured, sovereign immunity should, in general,
be a defense for a majority foreign state air carrier or manufacturer in an action arising out of an extraterritorial accident."' In
that case, a plaintiff would find no relief under the three commercial activity exceptions found in section 1605 (a) (2). This conclu-

sion is based on the following reasons. First, since the underlying
tortious act took place outside the territory of the United States,
our hypothetical tort claim would not be based upon the foreign
state's commercial activity in the United States. Second, since
clause two requires that the situs of the accident be in the United
Dutch Antillean Air
Finnair
KLM
Lufthansa
Pakistan International
Royal Air Maroc
Sabena
Viasa

***Netherlands
Finland
***Netherlands
***Germany
Pakistan
Morocco
Belgium
Venezuela

96.00
73.00
70.00
74.31
90.00
67.73
65.00
55.00

The following nine foreign air carriers appear to be over 50% state-owned,
but their exact ownership interests are not clear:
Aeroflot
U.S.S.R.
Avianca
Columbia
Czechoslovak Airlines
Czechoslovakia
El Al
***Israel
Iberia
Spain
LOT
Poland
South African Airways
South Africa
TAP
Portugal
TAROM
Romania
* This foreign state is not a party to the Warsaw Convention.
** These foreign states have exercised a reservation of rights pursuant to the
Additional Protocol, see Part V., sub. (c) infra.

** *These foreign states have expressly waived their immunity. See notes
99-111 infra, and accompanying text.
U.S. DEPT. OF

TRANSPORTATION,

GOVERNMENTAL

OWNERSHIP,

CAB,

BUREAU

OF

INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS,

SUBSIDY, AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AVIATION (1975). See note 54 supra.
Among the component and airframe manufacturers, here and abroad, are
Aerospatiale, Airbus Industrie, Antanov, Avions Marcel, British Aerospace,
British Hovercraft, Casa/Nurtanio, de Havilland Canada, Embraer, Ilyushin,
People's Republic of China, PEZETEL, Rolls Royce, Shorts, Tupolev and
Yakovlev. See note 85 supra.
87Cf. Perez v. Bahamas, 482 F. Supp. 1208 (D.D.C.
suffered personal injuries when the defendant's police craft
boat located less than one-half mile from Great Isaac Cay,
court held that under § 1605(a) (5), the injury did not arise

States and sustained immunity).

1980) (a minor
fired on a fishing
The Bahamas; the
within the United
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States, that clause would be inapplicable." Third, the presence of
an aggrieved party in the United States would not support the
"direct" effect requirement of clause three. As an ineluctable result, an aggrieved shipper or passenger would be totally without
remedy, unless a waiver of immunity existed in American federal and state courts for damages arising out of an extraterritorial
accident involving a foreign state air carrier or manufacturer.
The interplay between the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Aviation Act)," Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,"
and the Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), on
the one hand, and the Immunities Act, on the other hand, will be
the source of both explicit and implicit waivers of foreign sovereign
immunity in an American court. With respect to this waiver issue,
two sections of the Immunities Act are pertinent. Section 1604
provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign
state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605
to 1607 of this chapter."
In addition, section 1605 provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of

the courts of the United States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the
waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver... ;93
8 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2), cl. 2 (1976) with 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5)
(1976). E.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980)

(no immunity from liability arising out of an assassination in the United States).
8949 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
" See text accompanying notes 99-111 infra.

' Adherence, October 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
The Warsaw Convention was concluded at Warsaw, Poland on October 12,
1929. For a lively discussion of the historical background of this and related
treaties see Salacuse, The Little Prince and the Businessman: Conflicts and
Tensions in Public International Air Law, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 807 (1980).
"28 U.S.C. S 1604 (1976).

9328 U.S.C. S 1605(a)(1)

(1976).
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We now turn to these three sources of waiver of foreign sovereign

immunity.
A. Aviation Act
The Aviation Act is a source of an express waiver of immunity

for foreign state air carriers. Under the Aviation Act no foreign air
carrier navigating an aircraft in the United States is permitted to
engage in "foreign air transportation'"" unless it holds a permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board (Aeronautics Board)."
Pursuant to the authority delegated it by Congress through the
Aviation Act, the Aeronautics Board issued a regulation requiring
owners and operators of air carriers that are owned by foreign
states and that engage in foreign air transportation to waive immunity expressly for any claim that might arise out of the carrier's
activities under the permit." Some legal experts have suggested that
a foreign state owning or operating an air carrier does not have the
right to plead the defense of sovereign immunity."7 These opinions
have been based upon the broad proposition that such an owner
or operator, merely by holding a permit, waives its immunity for all
purposes when it is sued in the United States. Such arguments ignore a critical issue. The Aviation Act defines foreign air transportation as carriage between the United States and a point
outside the United States."' The regulation incorporating that
""Foreign air transportation" means the carriage by aircraft of persons or
property between "a place in the United States and any place outside thereof ..
49 U.S.C. § 1301(24)(c) (Supp. III 1979).
149 U.S.C. 5 1372(a) (1976).
14 C.F.R. S 375.26 (1980) provides:
Waiver of sovereign immunity. By navigating a foreign civil aircraft in the United States pursuant to authorization granted by or
under this part, the owners and operators of such aircraft when
engaged in proprietary or commercial activities waive any right
they may possess to assert any defense of sovereign immunity from
suit in any action or proceeding instituted against any of them
in any court or other tribunal in the United States, based upon any
claim arising out of operations by such persons pursuant to such
authorization.
(emphasis supplied).
912 S. SPEISER & C. KRAusE, AVIATION TORT LAW 465 (1979). See Hearings,
supra note 36, at 51 where a similar position is taken by Mr. Bruno A. Ristau,
Chief of the Foreign Litigation Unit in the Civil Division of the Department of
Justice. His office is charged with the responsibility of representing the United
States in civil suits brought against it in foreign courts.
"8 E.g., Pan American Airways, Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 569, 572
(Cust. Ct. 1957).

1981]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INT'L AVIATION

709

definition governs only foreign air transportation and does not
purport to regulate flights carried on wholly outside the United
States. Accordingly, since the Aviation Act and this regulation are
limited by their terms, an express waiver of immunity pursuant
to this regulation will occur only under circumstances where, on
a given flight, the United States is an actual stopping place, point
of departure, or point of destination.
B. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
A Treaty of Friendship is a source of an express waiver of immunity for both foreign state air carriers and manufacturers. The
United States has concluded numerous bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Ten of these treaties contain express waivers of sovereign immunity by the foreign state party.
These waivers provide, in substance, that no enterprise owned by
a party, if it engages in commercial activity within the territory of
the other state, will claim sovereign immunity from suit." Treaties
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation containing this express
waiver have been concluded with the Western European states of
Germany, ® Ireland," ' Italy,'" and The Netherlands,'" and with

"E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950,
United States-Ireland, 1 U.S.T. 785, 797 T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269,
288, art. XV, para. 3 reads:
No enterprise of either Party which is publicly owned or controlled
shall, if it engages in commercial manufacturing, processing, shipping or other business activities within the territories of the other
Party claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its property, immunity
therein from taxation, suit, execution of judgment or other liability
to which privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject
therein.
(emphasis supplied). By ignoring the fact that these treaties require some contact with the United States, this language has been too narrowly interpreted. E.g.,
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 985
(N.D. Ill. 1980).
100Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United
States-Federal Republic of Germany,
U.N.T.S. 3, 26, art. XVIII, para. 2.
11 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
States-Ireland, I U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S.
XV, para. 3.
'02Treaty of Friendship, Commerce

7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273
and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United
No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269, 288, art.
and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United

States-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, 79 U.N.T.S. 171, 210, art. XXIV, para. 6.
03 See note 111 infra, and accompanying text.
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Greece, ' " Iran," Israel,1" Japan,""7 Korea,' ° and Nicaragua.'"
Typically these waivers encompass all types of entities and commercial activity.
In one instance foreign sovereign immunity was specifically addressed on a government-to-government basis. This was achieved,
not through the customary federal Aeronautics Board permit system discussed earlier, but through a special air transportation
agreement. On June 19, 1953, the United States and The Netherlands, by an exchange of diplomatic notes, effected an agreement
concerning air transport activities.' 0 By this Dutch-American exchange, the parties agreed that no air carrier owned by a party, if it
engages in air transportation into or through the territory of the
other state, would assert the defense of sovereign immunity from
'Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, United
States--Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1867, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, 224 U.N.T.S. 279, 314,
art. XIV, para. 5.
'03Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 909, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93,
126, art. XI, para. 4.
16Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United
States-Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, 570, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, 219 U.N.T.S. 237, 276,
art. XVII, para. 3.
10 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States--Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2077, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, 206 U.N.T.S. 143, 214,
art. XVIII, para. 2.
'08Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United
States-Republic of Korea, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2230, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, 302 U.N.T.S.
281, 326, art. XVIII, para. 2.
10 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United
States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, 463, T.I.A.S. No. 4024, 367 U.N.T.S. 3, 26,
art. XVIII, para. 3.
I" The Government of the United States and the Government of The Netherlands agreed
that neither Government will assert on behalf of any air carrier enterprise of its nationality, which engages in air transport
operations into or through the territory of the other, the defense
of sovereign immunity from suit in any action or proceeding
entered into against such air carrier enterprise in any court or
other tribunal of the other Government (or in the latter's territories or possessions) based upon any claim arising out of the air
carrier's operations to and from the territory of the United States
or the Netherlands, as the case may be, and further agree that
neither Government will authorize any such air carrier to assert any
such defense in its own behalf.
(emphasis supplied). Agreement effected by exchange of notes (concerning air
transport services), June 19, 1953, United States--Netherlands, 4 U.S.T. 1610,
1611, T.I.A.S. No. 2828, 212 U.N.T.S. 249, 250.
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suit based on any claim arising out of the carrier's operations to
and from the territory of either state.
Differences existed between the scope of the waivers expressed
in the Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and that
expressed in the Dutch-American exchange of notes. First, the
treaties govern off types of commercial activity, while the notes
dealt only with air transportation. Second, the treaties govern all
types of commercial entities, while the notes dealt only with air carriers. By their terms the notes did not reach other types of entities
in the air transportation industry, such as air frame manufacturers
and component part suppliers. Third, the treaties, in order to become applicable, merely require that each state conduct some commercial activity within the territory of the other state. There is no
requirement that the claim giving rise to the suit be related to the
commercial activity previously conducted in the other state. In the
notes, however, the claim and the commercial activity had to be
somehow related.
Apart from the differences in the breadth of activities and entities governed by these instruments, the absence of a requirement
in the treaties for a connection between the claim and the commercial activity makes the treaty waivers substantially broader than
the waiver found in the notes. These differences were apparently
appreciated by the United States and The Netherlands. On March
27, 1956, they concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation."' This treaty, like the others just discussed, contains a
waiver of foreign sovereign immunity which is very broad as to
both the entities and the activities of the foreign state in question.
C. The Warsaw Convention System
The Warsaw Convention is a source of an implied waiver of
immunity for foreign state air carriers. The United States is a party
to the Warsaw Convention."' Since commercial air transportation
frequently involves tickets reflecting international transportation," it is important to consider the manner in which the issue of
' Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United
States-The Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2073, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S.
231, 259, art. XVIII, para. 2.
"lMertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
"'3 "International transportation" is defined in Art. 1(2) as follows:
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foreign sovereign immunity enters the Warsaw Convention system.
Since foreign sovereign immunity is a defense which is personal,
it may be waived by the state. Thus, it is necessary to examine the
circumstances under which the Warsaw Convention may embody
a waiver of foreign sovereign immunity through a concession by a
foreign state air carrier to be sued in a given forum.
The Warsaw Convention is a treaty designed to regulate in a
uniform manner the conditions of international transportation by
air carriers for hire."' It does not apply to aircraft manufacturers
or suppliers. ' Reduced to its most elementary form, it provides that
there shall be a rebuttable presumption of liability of the carrier
and a monetary limit of the recovery which a passenger or shipper
may obtain."' Like private rights, a treaty may confer rights capable of enforcement in an American court without implementing
statutes."" The Judiciary has always construed a treaty as any other
contract."'
1. Article 2 (1)
Initially it should be noted that Article 2(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides:
This convention shall apply to transportation performed by the
state or by legal entities constituted under public law provided it
falls within the conditions laid down in article 1 [i.e., international
transportation]. 19
[A]ny transportation in which, according to the contract made by
the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there is a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting
Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject
to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another
power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.
Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876, 137 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as the Warsaw Convention].
" Article I(1) provides: "This convention shall apply to all international
transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire." Id.
11 In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 747 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
"1 Warsaw Convention, supra note 113, arts. 17, 20, 21 and 22.
.7 E.g., Z. & F. Assets Realization Corp. v. Hull, 114 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C.
Cir. 1940), aff'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 470 (1941).
18 Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921).
I9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 113, Art. 2(1).
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By virtue of this paragraph, every contracting foreign state, which
has not reserved its rights pursuant to the Additional Protocol,
would be deemed to have submitted itself to an Article 28 forum.
In order to understand fully the concept of consent to be sued
and thus waiver of foreign sovereign immunity, it is necessary to
distinguish carefully between subject matter and in personam jurisdiction. It is the current American view to require a court to undertake a three part test to determine whether it has subject matter
and in personam jurisdiction and therefore complete power to determine the rights at stake in a Warsaw Convention case.' ° To
satisfy the first part of the test, the passenger or shipper must first
establish that the American court has treaty jurisdiction.'' Article
28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the
plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at
the place of destination.'
Since, in the case of a foreign state carrier, "the domicile of the
carrier" and probably "his principal place of business" are, by definition, outside the United States, these forums may be eliminated
from this discussion. Accordingly, the Article 28 court will probably be American only when the "place of business through which
the contract has been made, or ... the place of destination" is in

the United States. Second, the plaintiff must show that the American court has jurisdiction in the domestic sense." Third, the plaintiff must show that the American court has in personam jurisdiction over the person of the defendant."
With respect to the first issue, treaty jurisdiction, the plaintiff
"See

Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir.

1971).
1' Id. Of course, the plaintiff must also show that there was an "accident"
and that it took place on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking. Warsaw Convention, supra note 113, art. 17. See McKenry,
Judicial Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention, 29 J. AIR L. & COM.
205 (1963).

"2'Warsaw Convention, supra note 113, art. 28(1).

"'Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
2MId, at n.4. Under the Immunities' Act these three prongs are interconnected. See note 37 supra.
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must bring suit in an Article 28 court."' With respect to the second
issue, domestic jurisdiction, when Congress has not vested exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts, the state courts
will generally have the power to hear the case."' Since the power
to hear claims against foreign states or cases arising under the Warsaw Convention has not been committed exclusively to the federal
courts, the state courts retain the power to hear these types of
cases."' Moreover, the federal courts, although courts of limited
subject matter jurisdiction, also have the power to hear a case
arising under the Warsaw Convention, regardless of the citizenship
of the parties.' 8 Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction in both
the treaty and domestic sense in the American courts should not
pose a serious problem under the Warsaw Convention.
The third prong of the jurisdictional test involves a showing by
the plaintiff that the court has in personan jurisdiction over the
air carrier.' 9 Both in personam jurisdiction over a foreign state air
carrier and foreign sovereign immunity involve the notion of consent to be sued. Article 2(1) of the Warsaw Convention makes
the entire treaty applicable to "transportation performed by the
state." If this clause means anything, it must mean transportation
performed by air carriers owned and operated by the state. It is
at this point that the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Immunities Act of 1976 join hands. One of the means by which a
defendant may voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of a forum
is through a forum selection clause in a contract." The Supreme
12- 452 F.2d at 800.
12'

See generally, 1A

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

5 0.201-0.202 (2d ed. 1980).

'1"A claim against a foreign state may be brought in either a state or federal

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). A claim arising under the Warsaw Convention may be brought in either a state court, e.g., Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974), or a federal court, e.g.,
Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971).
128 Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). Congress, through the Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369,
has eliminated the amount in controversy requirement for federal question juris-

diction. However, in the absence of a claim arising under federal law, an alien
may not claim federal question subject matter jurisdiction by anticipating the

defense of foreign sovereign immunity under the Immunities Act. Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, No. 80-7413 (2d Cir. April 16, 1981).
1" 452 F.2d at 800 n.4.
"'E.g., Berner v. United Airlines, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335
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Court of the United States has interpreted such clauses as agreements to submit voluntarily to the power of the selected tribunal. 1
The Court has declared that such a clause is enforceable unless it
can be shown to be unreasonable."2 While the Court did not announce this rule without qualifying language,1" it clearly sanctioned
such clauses. In the context of international transportation
"[tihe common denominator of all Warsaw contracts of carriage
is the consent of the carrier to transport the passenger (or goods)
and the consent of the passenger (or shipper) that the transportation take place. . . . Therefore, the limits of liability, the waiver
of certain defenses, the possible judicial forums available to the
plaintiff and the remainder of the treaty's apparatus flow from a
consensual relationship between the parties created by the contract
of carriage that incorporates the Warsaw Convention."
Section 1604 of the Immunities Act provides that a foreign
state's claim to foreign sovereign immunity is subject to existing
international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of the enactment of the Immunities Act.1 " A plaintiff in
a position to invoke the Warsaw Convention against a foreign state
air carrier should be able, through section 1604, to overcome the
defense of foreign sovereign immunity. This view is supported by
Article 2(1) that specifically governs the rights of the passenger
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.), afl'd, 3 A.D.2d 9, 157 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dept. 1956),
aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 170 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1957).
" The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Compare Birch

Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp.
311 (D.D.C. 1980); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980); and Ipitrade Int'l, S.A.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (forum selection, made in an arbitration clause in a contract, constituted an implied waiver
of foreign sovereign immunity) with Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981, 987-88 (N.D. I1l. 1980) and Verlinden B.V.

v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, No. 80-7413 (2d Cir. April 16, 1981)

(agreement to be sued outside

the United States is not a waiver of immunity from suit in the United States).
32
' The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
131Id. at 17.
134Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 334 (5ht Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
3'

By settling, in advance, the applicability of the Warsaw Convention, it

becomes independent of "fortuitous events." Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
21 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039

(1968).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

or shipper and transportation performed by the state through its
state air carriers and also by Article 28(1), incorporated in the
contract of carriage, that contains a forum selection clause. As a
result, when a foreign state is a party to the Warsaw Convention,
without a reservation pursuant to the Additional Protocol, an
American Article 28 court may properly pierce any immunity that
a state air carrier might otherwise enjoy.
2. The Additional Protocol
Article 2(1) of the Warsaw Convention makes the Convention
expressly applicable to "transportation performed by the state or
by legal entities constituted under public law." This generalization, however, is subject to an important qualification. The Additional Protocol of the Warsaw Convention provides:
The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right
to declare at the time of ratification or of adherence that the first
paragraph of article 2 of this convention shall not apply to international transportation by air performed directly by the state, its
colonies, protectorates, or mandated territories, or by any other
territory under its sovereignty, suzerainty, or authority."'
The Additional Protocol gives a signatory the right to make such
a reservation at the time of ratification or adherence. Ratification
of the Warsaw Convention without an exercise of the right found
in the Additional Protocol is no reservation."s In practice, only a
small number of states have availed themselves of this right. They
include Canada, Chile, the Congo, Cuba, Ethiopia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and the United States.""
During the Second International Conference on Private Air Law
during October 4-12, 1929 at Warsaw the British Delegate, Sir
Alfred Dennis, proposed the reservation now found in the Additional Protocol. The minutes of the conference are revealing:
Mr. DeVoe-Report Officer-At Article 2, we have a British
proposition which consists of reserving to the Government of the
United Kingdom the right not to apply the Convention in the case
of transportation performed by the State.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 113.
"SKelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation
Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
'9SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAw (4th ed. 1977) Appendix C, A16EA25.
137
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This reservation is very serious. In the case of the transportation
performed by the State for any reason, by any part of the Government which might call upon the prerogatives of the Crown, the
Convention shall not apply. 1"
Mr. Giannini-ItalyThe British reservation has very great importance in practice;
for the moment it has none, since there are no air transportation
companies belonging to the state, but it may nevertheless happen.1 '
Mr. Ripert-France-It is true that as early as the first sessions
the British Government has always indicated to us that it would
request a reservation for transportation performed by the state;
but I think that most of us had understood that it would be transportation performed by the State in public interest, in the interest of the State and not simply commercial transportation.
In the form in which it is presented right now, the reservation of
the British Government tends to check the Convention every time
the transportation is performed by an aircraft belonging to the
state.
I am really sorry about this proposition because it is going to
allow all the states which organized commercial transportation
themselves to escape the rules of the Convention. . .. "
The phrase carriage "performed directly by the state" has been
considered by a number of American courts. Notably none directly
involved a state that exercised its right under the Additional Protocol or owned or operated the aircraft involved in the suit. In
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc." the defendant was a civilian
owner and operator of an aircraft chartered by the United States
government for the transportation of military cargo and personnel
to military destinations outside the United States. The Second Circuit had to decide whether this carriage was "performed by the
United States," thereby making the Warsaw Convention inapplic140 Minutes, Second International Conference on Private Air Law, in Warsaw, Poland, 97 (October 4-12, 1929) (Reprinted under the authority of the
Secretary General of I.C.A.O. with the permission of the Republic of Poland,
Warsaw 1930) [hereinafter cited as Minutes].
1
14 Id. at 98.
4MId. at 98-99.
4 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
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able by virtue of the Additional Protocol right previously exercised
by the United States in 1934. The court rejected this contention by
holding:
We are of the opinion, however, that the transportation was performed by the Flying Tiger Line, the owner and operator of the
aircraft, and that it was performed for the United States, not by
the United States.'"
In Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Belge D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne" Sabena's aircraft crashed in Belgium. The plaintiffs
argued that Sabena, an airline owned by Belgium, should not be
protected by the Warsaw Convention because Belgium allegedly
invoked the Additional Protocol. This argument was quickly answered: "Belgium ... did not exercise the right to such exemption
when it ratified the Convention and the Additional Protocol in
1936."' " After having held that the Additional Protocol was irrelevant to the case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York observed:
However, the legislative history surrounding the formulation of the
Additional Protocol, as well as a reading of that Protocol in conjunction with Article 2(1), indicates that such an exemption would
not apply to "legal entities constituted under public law" acting
in a purely commercial character, notwithstanding partial or even
complete state ownership therein. See Cheng, XI Current Legal
Prob. 225, 254 (1958) . . . ; Shawcross & Beaumont, Air Law §
324 n. (a) at p. 300 (2 ed. 1951).""
In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.," defendant's aircraft departed from California carrying soldiers destined for Saigon via
Honolulu, Wake Island, Guam and Manila. The plane disappeared.
The United States government had entered into an agreement with
the carrier for the transportation of these passengers." The plaintiffs contended that the "flight is subject to the reservation that the
Convention does not apply to international transportation which is
d. at 853 (italics original).
1 242 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
14

4

'1

Id. at 147.

1471d.

1" 234 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Cal. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d
494 (9th Cir. 1965).

" Id. at 224-25.
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performed by the United States."' The United States District Court
for the Southern District of California rejected this argument: "the
chartered flight in the instant case was not ... performed directly
by the state. '
It is apparent that the question of when a state, pursuant to the
Additional Protocol, has directly performed international transportation has not been answered by an American court. Neither
Mr. Cheng1" nor Messrs. Shawcross & Beaumont,"u the British
writers, present authority which has answered this question. When
the foreign state in question owns and operates, not merely charters, an aircraft, the state should be considered as having directly
provided this transportation. It is submitted that when a foreign
state owns and operates an air carrrier which provides international
transportation, then that is "transportation by air performed directly by the state." Accordingly, when a foreign state is a party
to the Warsaw Convention, with a reservation pursuant to the
Additional Protocol, the Convention should not be a source of
waiver of immunity.
3. Non-Parties to the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention is a contract among nations. A problem presents itself when a foreign state air carrier promises international transportation, becomes involved in an accident, but is
not a party to the Warsaw Convention. Since subject matter jurisdiction of an American court involves the question of the court's
inherent power to hear a case, the consent of a defendant alone
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction. In the Warsaw Convention context it is too late in the day to argue that Article 28 is anything less than an absolute mandate on American courts of subject
matter jurisdiction over a claim involving international transportation. ' This obligation exists because the United States, being
150Id. at 231.
I5'
Id. at 232.
x Cheng, State Ships and State Aircraft, XI CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 225
(1958), cited in Kelley v. Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation
Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
' SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 324 (2d ed. 1951), cited in Kelley v.
Societe Anonyme Beige D'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp.
129, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 422 (4th ed.
1977).
'"Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971).
1971).
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a party to the Warsaw Convention, has a treaty-based duty to keep
the doors of its federal and state courts open to such claims. As a
result, a foreign state's failure to become a party to the Warsaw
Convention should not affect an American court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear a claim against its majority-owned air carrier.
Despite the existence of this American treaty-based obligation
when a foreign state is not a party to the Warsaw Convention it
would not appear that it has agreed to submit itself to an American
Article 28 court under the Warsaw Convention as envisioned by
section 1604"' or to have waived its immunity as envisioned by
section 1605(a) (1) of the Immunities Act. There is no language
in the Warsaw Convention which evinces an intention by the
parties to bind non-parties to the Convention. Articles 37 through
41 indicate the manner by which a foreign state can become a
party. Article 37(2) is pertinent:
As soon as this convention shall have been ratified by five of the
High Contracting Parties it shall come into force as between them
on the ninetieth day after deposit of the fifth ratification. Thereafter it shall come into force between the High Contracting Parties
which shall have ratified and the High Contracting Party which
deposits its instrument of ratification on the ninetieth day after the
deposit. " '
Although Article 1(2) defines international transportation and
does not expressly exclude non-party foreign states, the Warsaw
Convention must be considered as an integrated instrument. Article
1 does not attempt to define the states which are covered by the
Convention. For this reason Articles 37 through 41 are important.
These articles show that the Warsaw Convention binds only Convention parties. The intention to have the Warsaw Convention bind
only parties is shown further by Article 1(2). Under that article
the Convention is not applicable to the contract of carriage when
the point of departure or destination of an international flight is
within the borders of a non-party, e.g., round-trip transportation
to and from a non-party with a stopping place in a party. In addition, the minutes of the conference show:
1 See also Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp.

383, 390 (D.N.J. 1979).
1 Warsaw Convention, supra note 113, art. 37(2).
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Mr. Richter-Germany-Before signing the Convention, I
would like to have this declaration inserted in the minutes:
Germany reserves the right not to apply the Convention with respect to a state which uses the reservation regarding Article 2 set
out in the Additional Protocol."7
Since the Warsaw Convention is a contract among nations, nonparties should not be bound by its implied waiver term. " ' To hold
otherwise would be equivalent to binding a state to an agreement
to which it is not even a party." 9 As a result, when a foreign state
is not a party to the Warsaw Convention, the Convention should
not be the source of a waiver of immunity.
4. The Montreal Agreement
The Agreement Relating to Liability of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol (Montreal Agreement)' is not a source
of waiver of foreign sovereign immunity. The Montreal Agreement
applies "to a particular type of Warsaw Convention international
transportation, namely, that which involves a point of origin, point
of destination, or agreed stopping place in the United States.' The
Montreal Agreement, unlike the Warsaw Convention, is neither
a treaty nor a treaty amendment. Instead, it is an agreement by
international air carriers to waive certain defenses in return for a
limitation of liability in the event of an action alleging a breach of
duty and damages therefrom.'" By definition the Montreal Agreement comes into play against a foreign state air carrier only after
a plaintiff has established both subject matter jurisdiction under the
Warsaw Convention and in personam jurisdiction under the ImI- Minutes, supra note 140, at 151.
' It is submitted that Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S.A., 102
F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952), holding that an air carrier owned by a non-party
is protected by the Warsaw Convention, was wrongly decided. The two cases
cited in Glenn to support this view--Garcia v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,
269 A.D. 287, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317 (2d Dept. 1945), aft'd, 295 N.Y. 852 (1946),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 824 (1949), and Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 1 Av.
L. REP. (CCH)5 622 (Court of Appeals, England, 1936)-are inapposite. Both
cases involved air carriers of parties.
159Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921).
e'Agreement, C.A.B. No. 18900, approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
May 13, 1966.
"I1Tompkins, The Aftermath of a Hijacking-Passenger Claims and Insurance, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 381, 388 (1973).
62 Id.

at 390.
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munities Act. In short, the Montreal Agreement does not establish
any jurisdiction, but merely assumes its presence. Since the Montreal Agreement does not embody any notion of consent to be sued,
it should not be considered, like the Warsaw Convention, to be a
source of waiver of foreign sovereign immunity pursuant to either
section 1604' or section 1605(a) (1)16 of the Immunities Act.
VI. SUGARMAN v. AEROMEXICO

In any body of law, particularly an emerging one, it is important
to build firm foundations. Unfortunately, the issue of foreign sovereign immunity has become murky as applied to foreign state air
carriers. To date, there has been only one case under the Immunities Act that squarely decided the question of an air carrier's right
to foreign sovereign immunity. This case substantially conflicts
with the line of cases exemplified by Harris.
In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc.' the plaintiff sued an air carrier that was a foreign state within the meaning of the Immunities
Act. " He purchased his Aeromexico round-trip ticket to Acapulco
in New Jersey."" During the last twenty-four hours of his trip he
suffered injuries while awaiting his flight back to New York."8 The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Sugarman's complaint. It held that Aeromexico was a foreign state and that none of the three excepting clauses of section
1605 (a) (2) applied to the case.' Further, there was no waiver
of immunity under the circumstances.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed and reinstated the complaint. It agreed with the
district court that neither clause two, requiring an action to be
16328

U.S.C. 51604 (1976).

16428

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).

16 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).

16Aeromexico, Inc. is the national airline of the Republic of Mexico and
is a common carrier of passengers between Mexico and the United States. Id.
It is a Mexican corporation and is wholly-owned by Mexico, id. at 271, and is,
therefore, a "foreign state" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) and (b)
(1976).
167626 F.2d at 273.
'"6 Sugarman alleged that Aeromexico caused him "to wait for 15 hours
under extremely brutal conditions." Id. at 271. He allegedly suffered "cardiac
insufficiency, angina and arrythmia." Id.
I" Id. at 272.
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based on an act performed in the United States, nor clause three,
requiring a direct effect in the United States, applied to Sugarman's claim." ' After finding that Sugarman's claim was "based
upon" a commercial activity in the United States, the court of
appeals held that his claim could be maintained under clause one
of section 1605 (a) (2)."' In deciding that clause one vitiated Aeromexico's claim of immunity, the court ruled that there was a link
between Aeromexico's alleged tortious conduct in Mexico and its
commercial operations in the United States." '
Clearly, Aeromexico engaged in commercial activity in the
United States. For the court, Sugarman's ticket purchase in the
United States created the required nexus between his injury and
Aeromexico's domestic commercial operations. Under the court's
reasoning, the only way to hold otherwise would be to construe
clause one as requiring a domestic injury situs. The court concluded that if Congress intended clause one to apply only to domestic misconduct, it would have spelled out that intention more
definitely.
It is significant that the Harris analysis is directly opposite to
the Sugarman court's view of clause one. In Harris the court held
that under clause one the action must be " 'based upon' the specific
commercial activity" carried on in the United States." ' It is not
enough that the action be connected with such domestic business.
According to Harris, clause one was not designed to function like
the "doing business" jurisdictional basis whereby jurisdiction could
be predicated on "systematic and continuous" contact with the
forum. Significantly, the court in Harris was able to marshal considerable legislative and judicial history for its view of clause one,
while in Sugarman the court relied on its own notion of statutory
construction and on a now useless relic, the Tate letter.
Sugarman is susceptible to criticism on a number of salient
grounds. The commercial activity out of which Sugarman's claim
arose was the carrier's pre-flight ground operations in Acapulco.
Despite the integration of the carrier's ticket sales and marketing
1:3Id.
171

Id. at 273.

Id.
Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1061 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(emphasis supplied).
17

"'
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operations in the United States and its flights between the United
States and Mexico, the relationship between those activities and the
operation of the carrier's terminal in Mexico is tenuous. The thrust
of Sugarman's suit was the carrier's alleged tortious breach of duty
in Acapulco before Sugarman became a passenger on the return
flight. The gravamen of his complaint was not a breach of the contract of carriage made in the United States. Instead, his claim was
really based upon the carrier's tortious commmercial activity in
Mexico and not upon its contractual commercial activity in the
United States. Accordingly, his claim did not fall within clause one
because there was no close connection between the alleged extraterritorial tort and the domestic ticket purchase."
Congress decided to deal with actions based upon extra-territorial
acts through clause three. As noted earlier, this clause provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States in any case ....
(2) in which the action is based . . .upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
Sugarman's claim was founded upon an act outside the territory
of the United States "in connection with,".' 7. not "based upon,
Aeromexico's commercial activity in the United States. This satisfied the first requirement of clause three. However, as shown by
both Upton'" and Harris,8 Aeromexico's acts did not have a
"direct" effect in the United States. This failed to satisfy the second
requirement of clause three. Accordingly, the only clause directly
applicable to Sugarman should have, as a matter of law, precluded him from any relief against Aeromexico. The foregoing
Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d
"'E.g.,
Cir. 1964); Corke v. M. S. Song of Norway, 435 F. Supp. 308, 310 (W.D.N.Y.
1977).
1-528 U.S.C. 5 1605(a)(2), cl. 3 (1976).
0
1d.,
I cl. 1.
177Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978), afJ'd,
607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
78 Harris v. VAO Intourist, 481 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The
author wishes to thank Aeromexico's attorneys for making available to him
Aeromexico's brief and appendix which were submitted on plaintiff's appeal from
the order dismissing the complaint.
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analysis should cast doubt on the vitality of the Sugarman interpretation of clause one.
Finally, there probably could not have been any claim by Sugarman that Aeromexico had waived its immunity either expressly under the Aviation Act, because Aeromexico was not navigating
under its Aeronautics Board permit, or implicitly under the Warsaw Convention, because at the time of his alleged injuries Sugarman was not "embarking" onto the aircraft within the scope of the
Warsaw Convention. Morever, since the United States and Mexico
were not parties to a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, there was no express waiver of immunity.
VII. CONCLUSION

As noted, the questions of standing, the general rule of foreign
sovereign immunity, its exceptions, and waiver of immunity are
to be answered in that order. The identity of the defendant is critical, not only to the issue of standing, but also to the waiver question. The Aviation Act and the Warsaw Convention, sources of
both explicit and implicit waivers of immunity, are relevant only to
foreign state air carriers and not to manufacturers. In this connection it is doubtful, even in a case involving the Warsaw Convention, that the Convention would be a source of implicit waiver by
a foreign state that has reserved its rights pursuant to the Additional
Protocol or by a non-signatory. To hold otherwise would bind a
foreign state to a contract to which the foreign state has either reserved its rights or is not even a party. In addition, a waiver of immunity with respect to a manufacturer will not be found among
those instruments. On the other hand, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation do not distinguish between foreign state air
carriers and manufacturers. Yet, while the scope of their waiver
provisions is broad, their applicability is limited because those
treaties depend entirely on the identity of a group of ten foreign
states.
The basis of the plaintiff's relationship with the air carrier is also
important. The Warsaw Convention system is founded on the existence of a contract between a passenger or shipper and the air
carrier that involves international transportation. Some passengers
on a given flight, wholly within a foreign country, will, and others
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will not, be traveling on a ticket reflecting international transportation. As a consequence, depending on the contents of the ticket,
some passengers will be within, and others will be without, the Warsaw Convention system. This difference is crucial for determining,
inter alia, whether in relation to a given passenger, the foreign
state air carrier will be able to assert the defense of immunity.
Finally, any changes in the present statutory scheme will have to
come from either the legislative or executive branch of our government. The legislative branch, by adding a "doing business" provision or by deleting the "direct" effect language from clause three
of section 1605(a) (2), could limit foreign sovereign immunity to
claims having little or no contact with the United States. The executive branch, through the Department of State and the cooperation of the Senate, could enter into additional Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, each containing an express waiver encompassing all enterprises owned by a foreign state.
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